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TOWARD A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
THIRD-PARTY FUNDING OF LITIGATION
Keith N. Hylton*
Because third-party funding and sales of legal rights are equivalent in
terms of their economics, I examine arrangements in which third-
party sales of legal rights are permitted today; those arrangements in-
clude waiver, subrogation, and settlement agreements.  These existing
arrangements provide valuable lessons for the appropriate regulatory
approach to third-party financing of litigation.
INTRODUCTION
Historically, common law has prohibited third-party funding of liti-
gation through doctrines such as champerty, maintenance, and barra-
try.1  These prohibitions, based largely on ethical concerns,2 still exist
in many common law jurisdictions today,3 though there is little evi-
dence of enforcement.  Firms offering lawsuit loans are not hard to
find in most American states.  One could take this, along with the fail-
ures of drug interdiction and economic sanctions, as yet another piece
of evidence that the law shrinks in the face of strong economic incen-
tives.  For the most part, using the law to prevent willing buyers and
sellers from making deals is a fool’s errand.
This Article has little to say about the law on third-party funding of
litigation; it focuses instead on the economics of third-party funding
relationships.4  The traditional ethical objections to third-party fund-
ing have suffered from a lack of clarity and precision.5  I proceed on
the view that in order to identify what is wrong with litigation funding,
we first have to understand how it affects the incentives of actors in
the litigation system.  I present two arguments: first, that third-party
* William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University, and Professor of
Law, Boston University School of Law.  E-mail: knhylton@bu.edu.  This Article was prepared
for the 19th Annual Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy at DePaul University.  I
thank symposium participants and symposium discussant, Andrew Gold, for comments.
1. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134–35.
2. See id.
3. Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 98–99, 99 n.162, 107 &
n.190 (2011).
4. This Article builds on the argument in Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Third-Party
Financed Litigation, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 701 (2012).
5. Id. at 705.
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funding and sales of legal rights are equivalent in terms of their eco-
nomics; and second, that the existing arrangements in which third-
party sales of legal rights are permitted—waiver, subrogation, and set-
tlement agreements—provide valuable lessons for the appropriate
regulatory approach to litigation funding.
The economic equivalence of litigation funding and sales of legal
rights is important because it helps identify the source of what is ob-
jectionable (if anything) in litigation funding.  In essence, the ethically
based objections are grounded in objections to the alienation of legal
rights.6  However, legal rights are sold today, and have been for a long
time, as commentators have observed in the case of settlement.7  The
mere equivalence of funding and sales, though a useful heuristic to
discover the ethical basis of objections, is insufficient by itself to sup-
port those objections.  A deeper analysis of how transfers of legal
rights could reduce society’s welfare is necessary.
The welfare analysis undertaken here suggests that regulation
should apply different rules to third-party litigation funding in the
context of unmatured legal rights—rights to sue for probable injuries
that have yet to occur—and in the context of matured legal rights—
rights to recover for injuries that have already occurred.8  With re-
spect to matured legal rights, an examination of the economics of ex-
isting sales arrangements suggests that there should be uniform
regulatory treatment of settlements and third-party sales.  This implies
that third-party funding of matured legal rights should be treated on
the assumption that it is no more harmful to society than settlement.
With respect to unmatured legal rights, my examination of the eco-
nomics of existing sales arrangements suggests that regulation should
be based on two principles: first, that the seller should have sufficient
6. On anti-market objections to third-party litigation funding, see W. Bradley Wendel, Alter-
native Litigation Finance and Anti-Commodification Norms, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 655 (2014).
One version of the ethically based objection holds that the sale of legal rights extends the market
into areas of life in which it should play no substantial role.  On critiques of the scope of markets,
see RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY
(1971); Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343 (1972); Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 72
(2003) (describing and analyzing settlement as a sale to the defendant of the plaintiff’s right to
sue).  There have been arguments lodged against settlement, see, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984), though they have typically pointed to possibly negative
effects, such as a reduction in the stock of rules generated by courts, rather than the fact that
settlement is effectively the sale of a legal right.  In any event, the practice is so well entrenched
that it is highly unlikely that any of the arguments against settlement will have any impact on its
prevalence.
8. I borrow the terms “matured” and “unmatured” legal claims from Robert Cooter, Towards
a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 383 (1989).
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information on the type of purchaser to set an appropriate price, and
second, that the purchaser’s incentive to enforce the right should be
aligned with that of the seller.  These principles suggest that some re-
strictions on third-party funding in the context of unmatured legal
rights may be socially desirable.
II. FORMS OF THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN LITIGATION
Consider a simple example that illustrates the different scenarios in
which third-party funding of litigation may operate.  Suppose the vic-
tim, a skier, is injured at a ski resort due to the negligence of the re-
sort’s operators.  Her injuries generate a claim for damages of $50,000.
How could a third party finance the victim’s claim against the ski
resort?
One scenario would involve the third party purchasing the entire
claim from the victim.  The third party might offer the victim $20,000
in exchange for full ownership of the tort suit.  Such ownership would
entail the right to appropriate the final judgment and to control the
litigation.  It would also entail an agreement in which the victim testi-
fies and offers evidence on behalf of the claim in court, even though
the third party would pocket the final judgment.
A second scenario, similar to the first, would involve the third party
offering to finance the victim’s lawsuit in exchange for all or some
share of the final judgment.  Notice that if the third party finances the
lawsuit in exchange for all of the judgment, this scenario is not signifi-
cantly different from the first.  In both scenarios the third party gives
the victim money up front in exchange for taking the judgment at the
end.  If the third party finances the lawsuit in exchange for a share of
the judgment, then the third party becomes a part owner rather than
the sole owner of the lawsuit.
A third scenario to consider is one in which the third party enters
into a contract with the victim before the victim visits the ski resort.
In this case, the third party and the victim agree that the third party
will appropriate any tort judgment for the victim if the victim is in-
jured at the ski resort.  In this contract, the third party pays the victim
in advance to gain ownership of her tort rights against the ski resort.
A more complicated version of the same deal would involve the third
party negotiating in advance of the accident for partial ownership of
the final judgment.
Each of these scenarios involves some elements of risk sharing and
transfer of control.  The first two scenarios involve the ex post transfer
or acquisition of legal rights, which is the transfer of a right to bring
suit for a claim that has already materialized or matured.  The third
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scenario involves the ex ante transfer of legal rights, which is the trans-
fer of a legal claim before it has materialized or matured.  In these
scenarios the third party becomes a residual owner of the victim’s le-
gal claim by virtue of transferring a fixed fee to the victim and gaining,
in exchange, ownership of all or part of the victim’s uncertain and
variable final judgment.  The only difference in the outcome of the
scenarios is that the victim retains part ownership of the final judg-
ment in some and relinquishes ownership of the final judgment en-
tirely in others.  The difference between part and full ownership is a
function of the degree of risk, as well as the degree of control, that the
third party chooses to assume in the contract.
Transfer of control, in whole or in part, is a predictable feature of
the contracts under consideration.  If a third party gained ownership
of the entire judgment and did not gain control over the prosecution
of the victim’s case, then she would have purchased something of po-
tentially little value.  In the absence of any third-party control, the
victim, after selling her right to the final judgment, could choose not
to enforce the right through litigation.  Given such a risk, the third
party would be unlikely to pay a significant amount for the right.
It bears repeating that third-party funding is, in essence, equivalent
to the sale of all or a share of the final judgment of a lawsuit.  It may
seem at first glance that the policy issues raised by the sale of legal
rights are different from the policy issues raised by the third-party fi-
nancing of lawsuits.  However, the economic equivalence of financing
and sale implies that the policy issues surrounding the two are mostly
the same.
A. Law in a Nutshell
I have not addressed the legality of any of the foregoing hypotheti-
cal scenarios; for the most part, they all raise issues of legality.  Each
of the scenarios would likely violate common law rules prohibiting the
transfer of legal claims to third parties, generally referred to as
prohibitions on maintenance, champerty, and barratry.  Maintenance
is the provision of financial or other support to a lawsuit.  Champerty
is a special type of maintenance in which the third party collects a
portion of the judgment.  Barratry is the practice of stirring up litiga-
tion, described as “a continuing practice of maintenance or
champerty.”9
Lately, these common law prohibitions have begun to be relaxed in
many jurisdictions, and accordingly, the legal issues have become
9. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424 n.15 (1978) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *134–36).
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murky.  In spite of this, the first (ex post sale) and third (ex ante sale)
scenarios—in which an unrelated third party purchases the entire
value of the legal claim of the victim10—would probably be prohib-
ited, or at least unenforceable, in most jurisdictions.  The more com-
plicated scenarios in which the third party agrees to finance the
litigation in exchange for a portion of the final judgment would sur-
vive scrutiny in some jurisdictions, but not all.
B. Understanding Economics and Ethics
This Article focuses on the economics and ethics of third-party
funding and the legal basis for regulation.  To gain insight into these
issues, it is useful to consider the accepted forms under which legal
rights are transferred today.  Those forms are settlements, waiver
agreements, and subrogation agreements.  In a standard settlement,
the plaintiff agrees to end her lawsuit in exchange for money from the
defendant.  In effect, the plaintiff sells her right to bring suit to the
defendant.  The difference between a settlement and a waiver is that
the sale of the right to sue occurs ex post in the settlement setting,
while it occurs ex ante in the waiver setting.  In a subrogation agree-
ment, the potential victim sells her right to sue ex ante to a third party,
typically an insurer.
The policy controversy generated by third-party funding of litiga-
tion follows more or less from the laws that restrict a third party from
purchasing a legal claim either ex post or ex ante.  In most jurisdic-
tions, the ex post sale of personal tort claims to third parties is prohib-
ited.11  The ex ante sale of personal claims is also prohibited, though
an exception is made for the subrogation agreement.  Are there sound
reasons for these prohibitions, and are they consistent with one an-
other in view of the underlying economics of rights transfers?  To an-
swer these questions, I will take a closer look at the economics of
waiver, subrogation, and settlement agreements.
10. It is important to distinguish a claim for personal injury from a claim based on a contract.
Unlike personal injury claims, contract- and property-based claims are assignable to third par-
ties, especially matured claims concerning debt or property. See, e.g., Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v.
Baker, 172 F.2d 689, 691–92 (4th Cir. 1949); Alcman Servs. Corp. v. Bullock, 925 F. Supp. 252,
258 (D.N.J. 1996), aff’d, 124 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok,
Crowd-Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 474
(2014); Hylton, supra note 4, at 707.
11. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 4, at 702, 707.
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III. EX ANTE SALES OF LEGAL RIGHTS
Ex ante sales of legal rights exist in the form of waiver agreements
and subrogation agreements.  While the law views waiver agreements
with suspicion, subrogation agreements are treated as socially be-
nign.12  In order to understand the bases for these views, one should
examine the economic incentives and welfare effects of such
agreements.
A. Basic Economics of Waiver Agreements
Suppose that long before an accident occurs the likely injurer ap-
proaches the likely victim and asks the victim to waive her right to
bring a tort suit against the injurer.  How much will the victim demand
in compensation for selling her tort claim?  If the victim sells her right
to sue the injurer, the injurer will no longer have a need to take care
in order to avoid liability.  Thus, the victim knows that once she has
waived her right she will face a greater risk of being harmed by the
injurer.
To simplify, assume that liability is strict.  The victim will be com-
pensated for the harm she suffers if she retains her right to sue,
whether or not the injurer takes care.  Thus, the expected incremental
harm to the victim, as a result of selling her tort claim to the injurer, is
simply the probability that the injurer will injure her (when the injurer
does not take care) multiplied by the loss from injury.  If the victim
did not sell her tort claim, her expected injury loss would be zero be-
cause she would receive full compensation under strict liability.
However, if the victim waives her right to sue, she gains the benefit
of not bearing the cost of bringing suit.  Taking into consideration the
costs and the benefits of a waiver, the victim will need to be compen-
sated for the expected injury due to the injurer’s lack of care, less the
expected cost of suing to collect damages when the injurer does take
care.  For example, suppose the probability of injury when the injurer
does not exercise care is .75, and the probability of injury when she
does take care is .25.  If the victim’s loss is $50,000 and the litigation
cost is $20,000, the minimum payment that the victim will require in
order to waive her right to sue the injurer is (.75 × $50,000) – (.25 ×
$20,000) = $32,500.  Generally, if P is the probability of injury when
the injurer does not take care, Q the probability of injury when the
injurer does take care, L the victim’s loss, and Cp the victim’s litigation
12. Reuben Hasson, Subrogation in Insurance Law – A Critical Evaluation, 5 OXFORD J. LE-
GAL STUD. 416, 416 (1985).
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cost, the victim will sell her right to sue in tort for any payment greater
than PL – QCp.
What will the injurer be willing to pay for a waiver from the victim?
In the absence of such a waiver, the expected cost of the plaintiff’s tort
right to the injurer is equal to the sum of the cost of liability when she
takes care, the cost of litigation when she takes care, and the cost of
taking care.  The injurer will purchase the plaintiff’s tort right for any
sum of money that is less than the expected cost of the plaintiff’s tort
right.  Continuing with the assumption of the example in the previous
paragraph (specifically, that the probability of injury to the victim is
.25 when the injurer takes care), if the cost of taking care is $16,000,
the expected cost to the injurer of the plaintiff’s tort right is equal to
$16,000 + (.25 × $50,000) + (.25 × $20,000) = $33,500.  Generally, if B
represents the cost of taking care and Cd the cost of litigation for the
injurer, then the expected cost of the plaintiff’s tort right to the injurer
is B + QL + QCd.
Waiver agreements will occur when the price the victim demands to
sell her right to sue is less than the amount the injurer is willing to pay
to purchase the victim’s right.13  Under the previous numerical as-
sumptions, the parties would enter into a waiver agreement because
the defendant would pay up to $33,500 for the victim’s tort right and
the victim would be willing to sell it for $32,500.
Waiver agreements eliminate tort litigation in settings where such
litigation would reduce society’s welfare.  The benefit to society of tort
litigation is equal to the injuries avoided because of the deterrent
threat of litigation, less the cost of avoiding those injuries.14  The cost
of tort litigation is the total amount spent on litigation.15  Litigation
reduces society’s welfare when the deterrence benefit is less than the
total cost of litigation.16  Whenever this is true, the potential victim
and potential injurer will have an incentive to enter into a waiver
agreement.17
All of this assumes a high degree of sophistication on the part of the
victim and the injurer.  If this assumption is relaxed, one can find cir-
cumstances in which a waiver agreement may not be beneficial for
society.  For example, if the victim cannot set a proper price for the
13. Using the general terms introduced in the text, the price the victim demands is less than
the price the injurer is willing to pay when PL – QCp < B + QL + QCd.
14. Using the general terms, the deterrence benefit is PL – QL – B.
15. The expected litigation cost is QCd + QCp.
16. Again, using the general terms, PL – QL – B < QCd + QCp.
17. The social welfare condition, (P – Q)L – B < Q(Cd + Cp), and the waiver condition, PL –
QCp < B + QL + QCd, are the same. See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate
Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 213 (2000).
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waiver, she may sell the waiver under conditions that reduce society’s
welfare.  Lack of sophistication on the part of likely victims may pro-
vide a justification for refusing to enforce waiver agreements in some
cases.  If the lack of sophistication is both severe and widespread, a
policy of prohibiting tort waivers may be socially desirable.
B. Basic Economics of Subrogation Contracts
In a subrogation agreement, a party that compensates the victim for
her loss gains the right to pursue the injurer for the amount that the
party has paid to the victim.  In the typical subrogation contract, a
medical insurer that has agreed to pay for the medical expenses of the
insured gains the right to sue the injurer for those expenses.  To sim-
plify matters, I will assume that the subrogating entity sues for the
entire loss suffered by the victim—that is, that the victim suffers no
losses above and beyond the amount covered by the subrogation
agreement.  The subrogation agreement requires the prospective vic-
tim (the insured) to sell her right to sue in tort, just as the waiver
agreement does.  However, the difference between the subrogation
agreement and the waiver agreement is that the subrogation agree-
ment involves a sale to a party who generally will enforce the tort
right,18 while the waiver agreement involves the extinguishment of the
tort right.  Because of this difference, the likely victim will sell her tort
right to the subrogating entity for a different price—a lower price than
she would sell under a waiver agreement.
One benefit the victim gains from a subrogation agreement, which
also provides a reason for her to enter into such an agreement, is that
she avoids the burden of having to pay to litigate if she becomes the
victim of a tort.19  The victim transfers her claim to damages to the
subrogating entity.  Since the subrogating entity maintains the threat
to sue in tort, the injurer will have an incentive to continue to exercise
care after the subrogation agreement comes into effect.  Thus, the vic-
tim will sell her right to sue to the subrogating entity for an amount
equal to the expected injury she would suffer, given that the injurer
takes care, less the expected cost of litigation, QL – QCp.
18. To be sure, the promise to enforce the tort right is not open ended.  If the value of the tort
claim is less than the expense of litigating, the subrogating entity may choose not to litigate, just
as the victim herself might choose not to litigate a small claim.
19. This statement reflects my simplifying assumption that the subrogation contract covers all
of the losses that the victim suffers.  This is not an accurate description of the typical subrogation
agreement.  A medical insurer that compensates for medical expenses only will not gain a con-
tractual right to sue for non-medical expenses, such as lost wages.
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If the subrogating entity can litigate less expensively than the victim
can, then both the victim and the subrogating entity may benefit from
the transfer of the victim’s tort right to the subrogating entity.  For
example, the subrogating entity may be able to litigate less expen-
sively than the victim because it is a repeat player in litigation, while
the likely victim has never been to court.  Thus, if the subrogating
entity’s cost of litigation is Cs, where Cs < Cp, then the subrogation
contract will be mutually beneficial, because the value of the victim’s
tort right to the subrogating entity, QL – QCs, will exceed the value of
the tort right to the victim, QL – QCp.
In the case where the cost of bringing suit is prohibitive to the vic-
tim, the subrogation option enables tort law to maintain its capacity to
deter tortious conduct.  In the absence of the subrogation option, the
victim would not have a credible threat to sue, and the injurer would
therefore not have an incentive to take care.  For example, suppose
that the probability that the injurer will injure the likely victim is .25
when the injurer is taking care.  Further, assume that liability is strict.
The value of the potential lawsuit to the likely victim is (.25 × $50,000)
– (.25 × $20,000) = $7,500.  If the cost of litigation for the subrogating
entity is $1000, then the value of the victim’s potential lawsuit in the
hands of the subrogating entity is (.25 × $50,000) – (.25 × $1000) =
$12,250.  This implies that the subrogating entity will be willing to pay
the likely victim an amount of money greater than the value of the
tort right to the victim in order to gain ownership of that right.  For
example, the medical insurer might offer a discount on insurance cov-
erage in order to share part of the value of the subrogation right with
the likely victim.
C. Importance of Identity of Purchaser of Ex Ante Right
In the previous subparts, I considered the economics of selling ex
ante rights to the likely defendant (waiver) and to an insurer (subroga-
tion).  Notably, the law permits both types of rights transfer, but with
heavier restrictions on waivers.20
In the case of a waiver, the price that a potential victim would put
on the sale of her ex ante right to sue is equal to the expected harm,
given the injurer does not take care, less the expected cost of litigation
in the scenario where she retains the right to sue.  In the case of a
subrogation agreement, the price that a potential victim would put on
20. The restrictions on waivers come in the form of public policy rules and rules on enforce-
ability of contracts (e.g., the unconscionability doctrine).  On the public policy restrictions, see
Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 443–46 (Cal. 1963).
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the sale of her right to sue to the subrogating entity is equal to the
expected harm less the cost of litigation, all estimated under the as-
sumption that the threat to sue remains in force and that the injurer
therefore takes care.  Since the expected harm to the victim is lower
when the injurer takes care, the price demanded by the victim to
transfer her right to sue is unambiguously higher in the case of a
waiver agreement than in the case of a subrogation agreement.
It follows that the identity of the purchaser is extremely important
in the context of an ex ante sale of legal rights.  A sale to an injurer is
much riskier for the potential victim than a sale to a subrogating en-
tity.  If the potential victim cannot be sure that she is selling to a sub-
rogating entity, her rational strategy would be to assume that she is
waiving her right to sue whenever she sells that right.  It seems ra-
tional victims would sell their rights mostly to injurers, since injurers
would make up the lion’s share of the parties willing to pay the price
demanded by the victim.  Due to this fact, an adverse selection spiral21
would probably arise in which the market for ex ante rights withered.
The difference between waiver contracts and subrogation contracts
can be expanded upon to include the ethical dispositions of attorneys
as potential purchasers of ex ante legal rights.  The incentives of a sub-
rogating entity do not differ from those of a lawyer who honestly rep-
resents the victim.  If a lawyer were to purchase the victim’s legal right
ex ante, she would offer the same price as a subrogating entity.  A
lawyer who is conflicted, in the sense that she is really the agent of the
injurer, would offer the same price for the victim’s right as would the
injurer.  The danger created by such a conflict, in which the lawyer
who purchases the victim’s ex ante right is really the agent of the in-
jurer, is that such a lawyer will offer a price (B + QL + QCd) that is
greater than that offered by the faithful lawyer (QL – QCs).  The vic-
tim who is unaware of the conflict would find that faithless lawyers bid
more for control of her rights ex ante than do faithful lawyers.
IV. EX POST SALES OF LEGAL RIGHTS
The most common ex post sale of legal rights observed today is the
settlement.  However, various contract rights, such as debt claims, are
also transferred to third parties.  Since such contract claims have fully
materialized, in the sense that the debtor definitely owes a certain sum
of money to the creditor, they should also be considered examples of
ex post sales of legal rights.
21. For a description of how adverse selection spirals are created, see Michael Abramowicz,
On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 743 (2005).
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A. Basic Economics of Settlement
I now consider the basic economic model of settlement and its im-
plications for the transfer of legal rights to third parties.  To the plain-
tiff, the value of the ex post right to sue is equal to the plaintiff’s
expected judgment less the plaintiff’s litigation cost, where the ex-
pected judgment is the product of the plaintiff’s estimate of her
probability of winning and the value of the damage award.  It follows
that if Wp represents the plaintiff’s estimate of her likelihood of win-
ning in court, the value of the ex post suit right to the plaintiff is repre-
sented by WpL – Cp.  For the defendant, the maximum that she is
willing to pay to gain ownership of the plaintiff’s ex post right to sue is
the total financial burden the defendant would bear if the plaintiff
sues, which is the expected liability plus the defendant’s cost of litiga-
tion.  Thus, if Wd represents the defendant’s estimate of the plaintiff’s
likelihood of winning in court, the maximum the defendant will pay
for the plaintiff’s right is WdL + Cd.  A settlement will occur if the
amount the defendant is willing to pay for the plaintiff’s right exceeds
the plaintiff’s valuation of this right, WpL – Cp < WdL + Cd, or equiva-
lently if the total settlement surplus, S = Cp + Cd + (Wd – Wp)L, is
positive.  As a general rule, the greater the surplus, the more likely
settlement is.22
Settlement generates wealth in two ways: by eliminating expendi-
tures on litigation and by transferring an asset (the right to sue) to the
party who places the highest value on it.  If the defendant thinks that
the plaintiff is more likely to win than does the plaintiff herself (i.e.,
Wd > Wp) then settlement effectively transfers the right to sue to the
party who values it the most.  The potential welfare gain from settle-
ment is therefore the sum of the litigation costs (avoided through set-
tlement) and the differential between the defendant’s and the
plaintiff’s valuations of the right to bring suit.  If the plaintiff values
the right to sue more than the defendant, settlement can still create
wealth as long as the litigation costs avoided are greater in total than
the difference in the parties’ valuations of the suit right.
What happens if the plaintiff sells her ex post right to sue to a third
party?  The third party will purchase the plaintiff’s right only if her
valuation of the right is greater than the plaintiff’s.  This scenario
could result if the third party’s estimate of the likelihood of winning is
22. This is a convenient assumption often adopted in the literature on settlement.  However,
the assumption is not necessarily correct in every instance.  Robert Bone notes that the size of
the bargaining surplus may not be positively correlated with the probability of settlement—liti-
gants may adopt “hard bargaining” strategies that make settlement less likely as the surplus
expands. See BONE, supra note 7, at 78–85.
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greater than the plaintiff’s or if the third party’s cost of litigation is
lower than the plaintiff’s.  The potential welfare surplus from transfer
is equal to the sum of the differential in litigation costs and the differ-
ential in claim valuations.  Thus, if W˜p and C˜p represent the third
party’s win prediction and litigation cost respectively, the surplus from
transferring the right to sue to the third party is Cp – C˜p + (W˜p – Wp)L.
Generally, if the transfer surplus is positive, the plaintiff will sell her
right to the third party.
As an aside, note that this presentation of the incentive to transfer
an ex post claim to a third party is also a description of the law-
yer–client relationship; the lawyer, in effect, purchases the ex post
right to sue from the client.  The client could bring the suit on her
own, pro se, but the lawyer can do so at a lower cost and with a higher
win probability.  In the typical contingency fee arrangement, the law-
yer agrees to pay a share of the judgment, often two-thirds, to the
client in exchange for control over the client’s claim.
In some settings the victim will be willing to settle her lawsuit while
the third party will want to litigate.  Indeed, as long as the win
probabilities are not changed by the rights transfer, any time a mutu-
ally beneficial sale occurs between a plaintiff and a third party (posi-
tive transfer surplus), the third party will be more likely to litigate
than would the plaintiff if she had held on to her right.  Thus, sales to
third parties will generally lead to a greater frequency of litigation.
The reason is easy to demonstrate in the basic settlement model.  A
mutually beneficial sale to a third party implies that the settlement
surplus will fall after the sale.  Given that the initial settlement surplus
when the victim retains the right to sue is Cp + Cd + (Wd – Wp)L, and
the settlement surplus after transfer to the third party is C˜p + Cd + (Wd
– W˜p)L, the initial settlement surplus exceeds the post-transfer settle-
ment surplus as long as the transfer surplus is positive (Cp – C˜p + (W˜p –
Wp)L > 0).  Thus, as long as the transfer of the ex post right to the
third party is mutually beneficial, the settlement surplus will fall after
the transfer, making settlement less likely to occur.
Will social welfare be enhanced or reduced when a victim who
would otherwise settle sells her ex post right to a third party who liti-
gates?  This is of immediate concern in the third-party-financing liter-
ature because opponents of third-party litigation financing have said
that it might lead to more frequent litigation, with the implication that
this is an undesirable outcome.  The important question, of course, is
whether social welfare will be enhanced in such cases.  The following
proposition is an implication of the economic model of settlement: As
long as the rights transfer does not affect the win probabilities, social
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welfare is unambiguously greater when the victim sells her ex post
right to the third party.
Support for this claim is easily demonstrated within the settlement
model.  The case in which the victim would settle while the third party
would litigate is where the settlement surplus is positive as between
the victim and the defendant (Cp + Cd + (Wd – Wp)L > 0), which
means that society’s wealth can be enhanced by the victim settling,
and the settlement surplus is negative as between the third party and
the defendant (C˜p + Cd + (Wd – W˜p)L < 0), which means that social
wealth cannot be enhanced by the third party settling.  If the victim
held on to and settled her tort right, social wealth would be enhanced
from the settlement.  If, however, the victim sells her tort right to the
third party, social wealth would be enhanced both by the sale and by
the third party’s refusal to settle.  The wealth generated by the sale
(transfer surplus) is Cp – C˜p + (W˜p – Wp)L, and the wealth generated
by the refusal of the third party to settle is (W˜p – Wd)L – C˜p – Cd.  Sale
to a third party who litigates is socially preferable to the victim retain-
ing (and settling) her claim if the wealth generated by the sale and the
third-party lawsuit (together) is greater than the wealth generated by
the victim’s settlement: Cp – C˜p + (W˜p – Wp)L + (W˜p – Wd)L – C˜p – Cd
> Cp + Cd + (Wd – Wp)L.  This condition holds as long as the settle-
ment surplus is negative (i.e., settlement is not mutually beneficial)
between the third party and the injurer, which is one of the premises
of this argument.  Thus, viewed from an ex post perspective, society’s
wealth is enhanced when a victim who would settle sells her right to a
third party who litigates.
It is important to note that this is an examination of welfare effects
in the market for ex post rights.  This discussion leaves out the implica-
tions of settlement for ex ante incentives.  A settlement might gener-
ate wealth in the ex post rights market but at the same time dilute ex
ante incentives to take care by reducing the total amount of damages
imposed on the injuring party.  Conversely, a transfer to a third party
may enhance wealth in the ex post rights market while at the same
time generating incentives for socially excessive care.  A comprehen-
sive welfare analysis would balance the welfare implications of ex ante
incentive effects with the wealth generated by rights transfers in the ex
post rights market.
One of the most important, if not the most important, points to note
about the ex post sale of legal rights is that the plaintiff’s valuation of
her right to sue is independent of the identity of the purchaser.  For
the original plaintiff, the value of her ex post right to sue is equal to
the expected net payoff from a lawsuit—the plaintiff’s expected judg-
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ment less the plaintiff’s cost of litigation.  This valuation remains the
same no matter who proposes to purchase the right from the plaintiff.
V. POLICY CONCERNS
The foregoing discussion reveals a fundamental difference between
ex ante and ex post sales of legal rights.  In the ex post setting, the price
that a holder of a legal right would set in order to transfer it to a third
party is independent of the identity of the third party.  In the ex ante
setting, the price the holder would charge in order to transfer a legal
right to a third party is dependent on the identity of the third party
since selling to the injurer is not the same as selling to a subrogating
entity.
This difference has two important policy implications.  First, there
appears to be no economic justification for prohibiting ex post sales to
third parties, or for putting special regulations on ex post sales that go
beyond what the law already places on settlement agreements.  Sec-
ond, sales to third parties of ex ante rights should be treated differ-
ently from sales of ex post rights in a regulatory framework for rights
markets.
A. Equivalence of Settlement and Sales
If the law permits a plaintiff (victim) to settle her case, which is
selling her ex post legal right to the defendant (injurer), it would seem
strange for the law not to permit the plaintiff to sell her right to a third
party who may value it more than the defendant.  However, this is the
state of the law in the majority of jurisdictions, though it is poorly
enforced.  What reasons could there be for such a distinction in per-
missible contracts?
One possible reason for prohibiting sales of ex post rights to third
parties is that the plaintiff may be too uninformed to enter into a mu-
tually beneficial contract.  To be sure, the plaintiff may not know the
value of a legal right ex post.  A person who suffers a slip and fall may
not be able to set a price on her tort claim against the property owner.
This might seem to present a problem in a regime in which rights are
transferred to third parties, but it is a problem that already exists in
the settlement context.  If the plaintiff has a good lawyer, that lawyer
will help her determine the price of her ex post right to sue, whether
that price is charged to a third party or to the injurer in a settlement.
Indeed, one could say that the market for lawyers is differentiated
primarily on the basis of the degree of skill that a lawyer brings to the
determination of a price for an ex post right to sue.  Lawyers are
2014] THIRD-PARTY FUNDING OF LITIGATION 541
clearly capable of bringing the same skills to bear on the question of
whether a plaintiff should sell her right to a third party, rather than to
the defendant in a settlement.  Permitting plaintiffs to sell their ex post
rights to third parties might create an auction market for legal rights,
permitting plaintiffs to receive the highest compensation amounts on
average, and allowing for society’s wealth to be enhanced by the
transfer of the suit right to the party who values it the most.
As Michael Abramowicz notes, sales of ex post claims could gener-
ate an adverse selection phenomenon,23 which might provide a justifi-
cation for prohibition.  Plaintiffs with low-value claims would be quick
to sell them while plaintiffs with high-value claims would tend to hold
on to them.  Any bid offered for a pool of claims would generate sales
mainly from victims whose claims are considerably less than the value
of the bid.  The market would spin into an adverse selection spiral,
and eventually disappear.  In this justification for prohibition, the in-
formational disadvantage of potential third-party purchasers is the
key problem rather than the informational disadvantage of potential
sellers (victims).
However, there are features of the legal market that would tend to
reduce the likelihood of an adverse selection spiral.  Respected law-
yers, who would need to protect their reputations, would not attempt
to make a short-term profit by selling off low-value claims on arguably
fraudulent terms.  The need to gain repeat business would discourage
them from being the facilitators of an adverse selection spiral.  Moreo-
ver, even if such a spiral were to occur, its effect would be to reduce
the size of a market, closing off a set of potentially wealth-enhancing
trades, without directly harming the owners of legal rights.  In other
words, if the adverse selection problem were to materialize, its effect
on social welfare would be limited in a manner similar to the loss in
social welfare that results from monopolization.  In the monopoliza-
tion setting, society loses from the absence of trades that would occur
in a competitive market, but society still gains from the trades that the
monopolist makes.  In the same sense, the adverse selection spiral
would close off some potential trades that would enhance society’s
welfare, but some welfare-enhancing trades would still occur.
23. Abramowicz, supra note 21, at 702.  The adverse selection problem Abramowicz empha-
sizes results because of private information of prospective victims, who know the potential value
of their claims better than others do. Id.  The adverse selection problem is also the source of
Abramowicz’s reform proposals in his contribution to this symposium. See Michael
Abramowicz, Litigation Finance and the Problem of Frivolous Litigation, 63 DEPAUL L. REV.
195 (2014).
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Although this argument is framed in terms of the sale of legal rights,
the implications apply directly to the financing of lawsuits by third
parties.  Third-party funding of litigation introduces the phenomenon
of rights ownership by third parties.  Indeed, a contract in which a
third party agrees to finance a lawsuit in exchange for all or a share of
the judgment is equivalent to a sale of the legal right, or a share of the
legal right, in exchange for an up-front payment.  Sales and financing
agreements are indistinguishable in terms of their economic
implications.24
B. Distinguishing Ex Ante and Ex Post Sales
The second policy implication of this analysis is that sales (to third
parties) of ex ante rights should be distinguished from the sales of ex
post rights in any attempt to design a regulatory framework for rights
markets.  The price a rights holder would charge to transfer her ex
ante right to a third party depends on the identity of the third party.
An individual who transfers an unmatured tort claim would want to
charge different prices to a subrogating entity than to the potential
injurer.  If the rights holder sells to the potential injurer, unaware of
the purchaser’s identity, the result will be a loss in deterrence because
the potential injurer will extinguish the right.  The loss in deterrence
may be socially undesirable, given the absence of an informed trade of
rights.  Unlike the ex post transfer market, inefficient transfers in the
ex ante rights market could result in a greater frequency of negligent
injury to tort victims.
This suggests that there is an economic case for regulation of the
transfers in a market in ex ante rights.  Regulation should be based on
two principles: that the seller (victim) should know the identity of the
purchaser (i.e., whether the purchaser is an injurer or subrogating en-
tity), and that the purchasing third party (if it is not the injurer) should
have incentives that are aligned with those of the victim.  The reason for
requiring that the victim know the identity of the purchasing third
party is a straightforward implication of the preceding arguments.  If
the victim does not know the identity of the purchasing third party,
then she may mistakenly sell her ex ante rights to a third party that she
24. There is a level of analysis, which is not carried out in this model, in which sales and
financing arrangements might generate different incentives, and here I am referring to agency
costs.  Still, the basic principle that sale and financing permit rights to be transferred to parties
who value them most implies that agency costs are likely to be lessened.  On agency costs and
financing of legal claims, see Ronen Avraham & Abraham Wickelgren, Third-Party Litigation
Funding—A Signaling Model, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 233 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation
Funding and the Problem of Agency Cost in Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561
(2014).
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thinks is committed to enforcement, when the third party is in fact the
injurer or the alter ego of the injurer.
Having the incentives of the third party aligned with those of the
victim is necessary in order to prevent instances in which the third
party sells, to the injurer, the legal right that she has acquired from the
victim.  Such a sale, of course, is equivalent to a waiver of the victim’s
right, executed by a third party.  In a regime in which any third party
can purchase the ex ante rights from the victim, there is a possibility
that the third party’s incentives to sell may deviate from the incentives
of the victim.
The incentive deviation problem arises because even though the
third party owns the victim’s legal right, she will not necessarily suffer
from the consequences of selling the right, specifically where the sale
amounts to a waiver.  If the third party sells the legal right of the vic-
tim to the injurer, she will suffer no harm from doing so.  However,
the victim will suffer the harm from such a sale.  Given this difference,
the possibility that the third party may waive the victim’s rights in an
inefficient transaction is much higher than the possibility that the vic-
tim herself would inefficiently waive her rights.
Looking more closely at the problem, the key distinction is that the
potential torts that arise when the victim’s rights are waived represent
a real harm to the victim, but they represent only an opportunity for
additional compensation—i.e., an opportunity cost—to the third
party.  If the third party, as rights holder, consistently sets a price on
the victim’s rights that fully reflects the opportunity cost of those
rights under the waiver regime, then there will never be a divergence
between the incentives of victims and third-party rights holders.  But
there is no guarantee that the third party will always take the opportu-
nity costs of the victim’s rights into account.  The third party may sell
the rights at a discount, perhaps because the third party is unaware of
the opportunity cost, is under financial pressure to generate cash, or is
trading away profit for market share.
The only simple way to avoid the incentive divergence problem is to
follow the pattern of the existing arrangements in which third-party
rights holders own the ex ante legal rights of potential victims.  These
existing models are the subrogation contract and the patent troll.25  In
the case of a subrogation contract, the subrogating entity’s incentives
do not diverge from those of the victim because the subrogating entity
is contractually bound to compensate the victim for all or a substantial
25. Patent trolls essentially purchase ex ante rights to enforce patents.  On patent trolls and
third-party litigation funding, see Hylton, supra note 4, at 722–23.
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share of the victim’s injuries.  Given this contractual commitment, the
subrogating entity generally does not have an incentive to waive the
victim’s rights in exchange for an inadequate price because the entity
has to compensate the victim anyway.
The other existing case of third-party ownership of ex ante rights is
that of the patent troll.  The patent troll typically buys the patent it-
self, not just the right to sue for infringement.  By taking ownership of
all or a substantial part of the patent, the patent troll aligns her incen-
tives with those of the original patent holder.  The original inventor
need not worry that the troll will inefficiently waive the right to en-
force the patent.
These examples suggest that the proper regulatory approach to
third-party transfers in ex ante rights would limit enforcement of such
transfers to instances in which either the third party has entered into
something akin to a subrogation agreement with the victim,26 or the
third party has purchased from the victim an asset whose value would
be put at risk by the waiver of rights.  Under such arrangements, the
third party’s incentives to trade the rights that it has purchased would
not deviate strongly from those of the original rights holders.  If the
third-party rights holder does not have an obligation to compensate
(as in the traditional subrogation relationship) or does not own an
asset that would be put at risk by the waiver of rights, one appropriate
regulatory approach would be the adoption of a judicial policy barring
enforcement of any agreement by the original victim to transfer her ex
ante rights in such cases.  Thus, in the scenario in which the victim
transfers her rights to a third party who then inefficiently waives those
rights, the victim would regain the right to sue.  This approach has the
virtue of simplicity.  The victim would be able to enforce the right on
her own without requiring the maintenance of a regulatory agency.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since third-party financing of lawsuits is equivalent in economic
terms to the sale of legal rights to third parties, this Article has fo-
cused primarily on sales and their associated incentive and welfare
effects.  My claim that there is no sound economic basis for a blanket
prohibition of the ex post sales of legal rights to third parties implies
that there is no sound economic basis for a blanket prohibition of the
third-party financing of matured legal claims.  Rather than basing my
argument on an overall welfare analysis of litigation in the presence of
26. Robert Cooter proposed a market in unmatured tort claims that is equivalent, in opera-
tion, to an expansion of subrogation markets. See Cooter, supra note 8, at 383–84.
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third-party sales, I have argued that if society permits settlements to
occur without heavy-handed regulation, then it should permit third-
party sales of ex post rights to occur too, on the same basis.  However,
if a welfare analysis indicated that settlement should be prohibited in
a particular setting, then the same analysis might show that third-party
sales of ex post rights should also be prohibited under the same
conditions.
The sale of ex ante legal rights is a more complicated issue, given
that inefficient transfers can have harmful consequences to potential
tort victims.  In view of this risk, there is a strong case for ensuring
that ex ante rights transfers do not result in potential tort victims waiv-
ing their legal rights unknowingly.  A market in which expanded sub-
rogation contracts are encouraged, or where a greater variety of
rights-assertion entities (similar to patent trolls) exist, should easily
avoid the risks associated with a market in ex ante legal rights.
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